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The conflict in Darfur, as commonly reported by North American 
journalists and activists, has a familiar narrative. Darfur, in these accounts, 
is a place where history is of little importance in understanding the present, 
where an evil Arab government has induced Arab tribal militia to kill hun-
dreds of thousands of innocent black African victims and displace millions 
more. The sole heroes in the tragedy are Western aid workers and activists 
who courageously save lives and speak out against the atrocities. Through 
these voices, Darfur is portrayed as a place where the forces of evil will 
continue to wreak havoc on a population of suffering victims without any 
agency until Western military forces intervene to save them.
War in Darfur and the Search for Peace, edited by Alex de Waal, fun-
damentally contradicts the simplicity of this typical mainstream account; 
indeed, it represents a welcome attempt to “complicate” the situation in 
Darfur. De Waal, an anthropologist currently based at Harvard’s Global 
Equity Initiative, is undoubtedly one of the foremost Sudan experts, having 
worked in (and on) the region for more than 20 years. War in Darfur and the 
Search for Peace features contributions from an impressive group of scholars 
from Sudan and the West. The result is a sophisticated and highly relevant 
collection of essays that is likely to become one of the most important refer-
ence guides on the conflict. The book addresses three main themes: first, the 
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causes of the war; second, the international efforts to resolve the conflict; 
and third, how the conflict in Darfur has been described and perceived in 
the United States.
UNDERSTANDING DARFUR 
The Darfur conflict is best understood as a “witch’s brew,” a conver-
gence of local, national, regional, and international factors that erupted 
into massive violence in 2003.1 Nationally, the roots of the conflict lie––
similar to the long-lasting North-South war—in the central elite’s greed, 
the concentration of power and resources in Khartoum, and the system-
atic exploitation of the country’s peripheral areas. In terms of the conflict’s 
causes, de Waal links the center-periphery dimension with another persis-
tent feature of Sudanese politics: “the inability of any one elite faction to 
establish unchallenged political dominance over the state.”2 Thus, Sudan 
is a “turbulent state” affected by “chronic political instability,” making it 
impossible for its rulers to realize a long-term vision of democratic gov-
ernance. Instead, as de Waal points out, they “have become skilled at the 
default option of short-term crisis management,” including the manipula-
tion of provincial elites and the arming of tribal militias. 
The piece “Native Administration and Local Governance in Darfur: 
Past and Future,” by Musa A. Abdul-Jalil, Adam Azzain Mohammed, and 
Ahmed A. Yousef, focuses on politics at the local level. The authors dissect the 
role of the native administration, a local governance system based on tribes 
that British colonial masters adopted from the pre-colonial Fur Sultanate and 
adapted for their “indirect rule” of Darfur. Post-independence governments 
have tried to undermine the authority of traditional tribal leaders and to 
instrumentalize them in order to gain control of Darfur. These policies have, 
according to the authors, “resulted in the politicization of the native admin-
istration and the increasing polarization between tribal groups in Darfur.” 
Land is also relevant in this context, as Jérôme Tubiana, in “Darfur: 
A Conflict for Land?,” draws attention to the fact that Darfur’s traditional 
land tenure system, the hakura, excludes certain camel-herding Arab tribes 
of northern Darfur. Desertification, population growth, and asset deple-
tion since the 1980s have fostered growing competition for land in Darfur 
and have threatened the existence of landless tribes. It is not surprising, 
Tubiana remarks, that the infamous Janjaweed militias consist primarily of 
young men from exactly these tribes.
Roland Marchal, in “The Unseen Regional Implications of the Crisis 
in Darfur,” contributes an interesting perspective on the regional dimen-
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sion of the Darfur crisis. Given its central location, Darfur has become 
the terrain of regional power struggles, which contributed to upsetting a 
delicate balance between local tribes. In the 1980s, Libyan leader Colonel 
Muammar el-Qaddafi sought to topple then-Chadian leader Hissène Habré 
and used Darfur as a springboard for his military adventure. Marchal notes 
that, in this context, “Arab tribes benefited from generous military supplies, 
which helped militarize land disputes and social contradictions in Darfur.” 
Eventually Habré was brought down and, with the support of Tripoli and 
Khartoum, Idriss Déby, a member of the Zaghawa tribe from the border 
region between Darfur and eastern Chad, installed himself in N’Djamena 
in 1990. The Darfur conflict broke out 13 years later, and Déby remained 
neutral so as not to jeopardize his alliance with Sudanese President Omar 
al-Bashir, who had helped bring him to power. When Khartoum began 
sponsoring rebel groups in eastern Chad, Déby himself was put under pres-
sure by members of his own Zaghawa clan. In this context, he desperately 
needed military support from the Darfur rebel movements, many of whose 
leaders are also Zaghawa. Consequently, the Chadian government began 
to provide logistical and military support to the rebels in 2005, protracting 
the conflict and turning Darfur into the stage for a regional proxy war.
It is no coincidence that Darfur’s current rebellion erupted when the 
North-South peace process was in its final stages. The fruit of this process, 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), does not include specific pro-
visions for Darfur. In his piece, “The Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
and Darfur,” Adam Azzain Mohammed points out that proponents ar-
gue for the CPA being “a charter for the transformation of governance in 
Sudan,” which benefits all the periph-
eries, including Darfur. However, as 
Mohammed argues, “the CPA cannot 
solve all of Darfur’s problems,” in par-
ticular with respect to power-sharing. 
Cognizant of the inadequacies of the 
North-South peace process, the Darfur 
rebels, following the example of the 
southern insurgents, the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), decided to stage a rebellion in or-
der to obtain compromises from the government at the negotiating table at 
a later stage. Also, the international community was heavily involved in the 
CPA negotiations and wanted to avoid “rocking the boat” by criticizing the 
Sudanese government for what was happening in Darfur.3
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NEGOTIATING DARFUR
On May 5, 2006, the Sudanese government and the Minni Minawi 
faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) signed the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja, Nigeria. A few months later, it 
was clear that the DPA was a complete failure; not only was the agreement 
never implemented, it actually made matters worse. In their piece, “Darfur 
After Abuja: A View from the Ground,” Abdul-Jabbar Fadul and Victor 
Tanner confirm that violence actually increased after the DPA was signed, 
and that signatory and non-signatory rebel groups fought each other instead 
of uniting against the government. Significantly, the authors note, the DPA 
also compromised the neutrality of the African Union (AU) peacekeepers, 
who were obliged to defend a deeply unpopular agreement that most rebels 
vehemently resisted. As a result, attacks on peacekeepers multiplied.
Much of the second part of War in Darfur and the Search for Peace at-
tempts to explain why the DPA failed so miserably. The shortcomings of the 
mediation and negotiation process, particularly in the final days leading up 
to the signing of the DPA, are the central focus of the book’s contributors, 
all of whom, including de Waal, were members of the AU mediation team. 
Peace talks began in Abuja in July 2004, with little subsequent progress made 
until April 2006, when the international community—in particular the 
United States—lost patience and resolved to put an end to the negotiations 
by using “deadline diplomacy.” One week later, just short of the deadline, 
the AU mediation team drafted a compromise proposal. International heav-
yweights, including former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick 
and Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, then descended upon Abuja 
to close the deal. With the government’s agreement to the AU mediation 
team proposal largely assured, Zoellick and Obasanjo turned their efforts 
to the rebel factions, using both threats and inducements to broker con-
sent. Ultimately, Minawi signed, but both his SPLM/A rival, Abdel Wahid 
Mohamed al-Nur, and the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM), Khalil Ibrahim, refused to do so. In the weeks after the signature of 
the DPA, the AU continued to mediate between the Sudanese government 
and al-Nur, and apparently they came “desperately close to an agreement, 
which . . . would have tipped Darfur towards peace.”4 The authors of War 
in Darfur and the Search for Peace univocally blame the failure of the Abuja 
negotiations on a rushed international community that destroyed the proc-
ess by imposing artificial deadlines. In “The Making and Unmaking of the 
DPA,” Laurie Nathan argues that the precipitous conclusion of the DPA 
hampered the flexibility of the mediators, contributed to a lack of direct 
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negotiations between the parties, made it impossible to involve stakeholders 
from Darfurian society and most importantly “precluded . . . the parties’ 
ownership of the DPA.”
Explaining the failure of the DPA, the contributing authors of War 
in Darfur and the Search for Peace place a surprisingly large emphasis on 
the negotiation process rather than the broader political context. Elsewhere, 
de Waal enumerates four conditions for successful peacemaking in Sudan: 
“solidification of central decision making . . ., cohesive leadership of the 
provincial insurgency, containment or resolution of conflicts in the neigh-
boring states, and a cohesive international approach.”5 As de Waal pointed 
out himself,6 none of these conditions 
were met during the Abuja negotia-
tions. One can argue, therefore, that 
given the political context, it was never 
realistic for the parties to achieve an ef-
fective and durable peace agreement for 
Darfur—even if al-Nur had signed the 
DPA and the final mediation had been 
less rushed and less manipulative. 
The Abuja talks kept the parties 
engaged in a peace process and may 
have selectively contributed to de-es-
calating the conflict; however, the au-
thors demonstrate that the DPA had an unmistakably negative impact on 
the situation in Darfur. It is not clear whether the Abuja negotiations have 
done more harm than good, and thus it is questionable whether peace talks 
should even have taken place under the prevailing conditions. Answering 
this extremely difficult political and moral question would be presumptu-
ous. However, it is unfortunate that the book does not provide a more criti-
cal perspective on the limits of peacemaking as a conflict resolution tool 
and that it fails to assess the feasibility of alternative approaches.
NARRATING DARFUR
The third part of the book describes the media coverage of the Darfur 
conflict in the United States. In her essay “Narrating Darfur: Darfur in the 
U.S. Press, March–September 2004,” Deborah Murphy examines more than 
80 editorials and Op/Eds on Darfur. Most pieces perpetuated a “narrative, 
which assigned polarized Arab and African identities to the perpetrators and 
victims, usually labeled it genocide, and assumed the government control-
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led the violence.” In terms of remedies, most writers urged outside military 
intervention, often invoking the shame of international inaction during the 
Rwandan genocide in 1994. Murphy finds that “most of the articles reviewed 
were not really about Darfur itself.” Rather, she says, “Darfur was the latest 
forum for the still-unresolved debate over what role the U.S. will play in the 
world when its values are in jeopardy but its interests are not at stake.”
Press reports were instrumental in the emergence of an influential 
Darfur advocacy movement in the U.S.—arguably the largest of its kind 
since anti-apartheid in the 1980s. There is no doubt that advocates have 
played a positive role, but at present they are stuck in the simplistic nar-
rative they created to grab the world’s 
attention. “For them, Darfur is not 
a place with a complex history; it’s a 
moral high ground,” notes Julie Flint, 
an independent journalist and co-au-
thor (with de Waal) of Darfur: A Short 
History of a Long War.7 Projecting reme-
dies based on simplistic assessments and 
flawed analogies onto a complex reality 
can be dangerous. The full-fledged war 
and widespread campaigns of destruc-
tion of 2003–2004 are over, and the 
humanitarian situation has become relatively stable. Therefore, de Waal 
argues, Darfur needs a viable political process, not foreign military inter-
vention. In the concluding chapter, “Darfur’s Elusive Peace,” he complains 
that advocates’ insistence on military solutions and unrealistic demands for 
a robust UN peacekeeping mission undermined peacemaking efforts and 
accounted for U.S. impatience with the Abuja negotiations.8
The criticism could have been carried further and the perverse ef-
fects of Darfur advocacy campaigns more clearly identified. Elsewhere, de 
Waal has highlighted how dangerous it is to attribute collective victim and 
perpetrator labels to apparently distinct ethnic groups.9 Quite obviously, 
this contributes to the polarization of already antagonistic identities. It also 
fosters neglect of reverse categories; the international community tends to 
brush aside crimes committed by “African” rebel movements and ignore 
the voices of moderate Arabs, who are hardly ever heard despite the crucial 
role that their empowerment plays in the peace process. Another problem 
relates to advocates’ insistence on labelling the conflict in Darfur as geno-
cide, as well as their tendency to exaggerate the estimated number of people 
killed.10 Indeed, this transforms concern for Darfur into an ineffective dis-
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cussion about legal categories and numbers. Is it genocide or “only” crimes 
against humanity? Did 200,000 or 400,000 people die? Such debates carry 
a high opportunity cost in terms of energy, resources, and time. Resources 
spent arguing could be put to better use to try to improve the situation. 
War in Darfur and the Search for Peace provides a welcome antithesis to 
the simplistic nature of the current Darfur debate, which would have been 
even more useful had it formulated an 
explicit and comprehensive critique of 
the Darfur advocacy movement.
David Kennedy, a Fletcher School 
alumnus and recently appointed Vice 
President for International Affairs at 
Brown University, cautions us that “the 
darker sides can swamp the benefits of 
humanitarian work, and well-inten-
tioned people can find themselves un-
wittingly entrenching the very things 
they have sought voice to denounce.”11 The Darfur advocacy movement 
provides a case in point in this regard. Therefore, it is time for advocates to 
assess how far they have come and settle upon a new strategy for the future, 
one that will make a constructive contribution to a lasting resolution of the 
conflict in Darfur. Reading Alex de Waal’s new book on Darfur would be 
a good first step. N
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